本院研討會：422次一般經濟研討會

時　間：民國108年6月24日(星期一)下午02時 00分
 

地　點：本院204會議室
 

主講人：新加坡國立大學經濟系陳逸羣教授
 

題　目：Efficiency of Stable Matching with Two-sided Incomplete Information
 

【主講人簡介】
Professor Chen received his Ph.D. in Economics from Northwestern University in 2009. He is currently an Associate Professor at National University of Singapore. His research fields are Microeconomics. Theory, Game Theory, Mathematical Economics and Information Economics.
 

【演講摘要】
We study two-sided job-market matching with incomplete information on both sides and transferable utility. We prove that all stable matchings are efficient, provided that either (1) it is common knowledge that the wage scheme is strictly increasing in the agents' types; or (2) the realized type distribution is common knowledge and all types are distinct.

【聯絡窗口】
副院長室秘書張碧娟（分機219）。