The U.S. midterm elections, scheduled for early November 2026, have raised questions about whether Republicans will retain their congressional majority and how the results may influence U.S. tariff policy toward Taiwan and security commitments. Daniel Liu, Director of the Regional Development Study Center at the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research (CIER), emphasized that while the election outcome is significant for Taiwan’s economic, trade, and security interests, it is inappropriate to equate policy changes solely with party victories or defeats. Even if congressional control shifts, U.S. trade policy may remain unchanged. Taiwan should proactively evaluate various scenarios and enhance its policy response capabilities.
Shift in Congressional Control Would Not End Tariffs as Sections 301 and 232 Retain Policy Influence
Liu noted that congressional elections could limit the administration’s ability to implement its agenda, but would not necessarily alter its policy direction. Existing legal instruments, such as Section 301 of the Trade Act and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, may still be employed if relevant legal and procedural requirements are satisfied. Even if congressional control changes, these measures will not automatically lapse. Policy adjustments will continue to depend on statutory authority, administrative procedures, and political negotiations.
If the administration faces challenges in advancing domestic legislation, it may still seek outcomes through international trade negotiations, such as requesting trading partners to increase purchases from the United States, expand U.S. investment, or make new cooperation commitments. Taiwan should not assume that tariff pressure will diminish following the elections. Ongoing monitoring of U.S. policy instruments and future negotiation directions remains essential.
Deepen Bipartisan Engagement and Translate Taiwan-U.S. Cooperation into Tangible Economic and Security Benefits
As the U.S. political landscape evolves, Taiwan should continue to expand engagement with the executive branch, both parties in Congress, and state and local governments to avoid overreliance on any single party or political figure. Liu emphasized that Taiwan should closely monitor post-election changes in congressional committee leadership and officials responsible for Taiwan-related issues. Maintaining policy communication channels is essential to ensuring that the United States fully understands Taiwan’s economic interests, security needs, and partnership value.
The jobs, technology exchanges, and business opportunities created by Taiwanese investment in the United States can also provide a strong foundation for deeper cooperation at the state and local levels. Building mutually beneficial relationships through tangible economic gains would enhance the stability of Taiwan-U.S. cooperation and reduce uncertainty arising from political and personnel changes.
Taiwan should also prioritize the implementation of security commitments. Arms sales must be evaluated not only by their announced value, but also by equipment delivery schedules, personnel training, maintenance capacity, ammunition replenishment, and other practical factors. These measures are essential for converting external support into effective defense capabilities. Simultaneously, Taiwan must strengthen its self-defense, critical infrastructure resilience, and crisis response capabilities to reduce reliance on external commitments.
Investment and Procurement Commitments Should Deliver Reciprocal Benefits
Liu stated that when the United States requests additional investment and procurement, Taiwan should deepen cooperation while seeking clear and enforceable market treatment in return. Negotiations should evaluate whether new investment will secure more stable market access, whether procurement commitments involve reasonable cooperation arrangements, and whether preferential measures have clearly defined scopes, implementation schedules, and durations.
Taiwan-U.S. industrial cooperation should be grounded in mutual benefit and reciprocity, rather than unilateral cost-bearing. The government should assist companies in evaluating the costs, benefits, and risks of investing in the United States. It should also clarify the boundaries between economic and trade commitments and security cooperation, avoiding the assumption that increased investment automatically ensures greater security protection. Transparent terms and clearly defined rights and obligations are essential for sustaining bilateral agreements.
Diversifying Export Markets and Supply Chain Risks Will Strengthen Taiwan’s Capacity for an Independent Response
In the first eight months of 2026, the United States accounted for 31.4% of Taiwan’s total exports, while mainland China and Hong Kong accounted for 24.3% and ASEAN for 20%. Although the U.S. market is increasingly important, Taiwan must carefully manage the risks associated with concentrated export markets and supply chains.
Liu advised that companies should not only diversify their markets, but also assess customer concentration, sources of critical components, and alternative logistics arrangements. U.S. tariffs, rules of origin, and export controls should be incorporated into routine risk management. The government should assist companies in developing new markets and partnerships to mitigate the impact of sudden policy changes on exports and production arrangements.
Strengthening Taiwan’s defense and maintaining necessary cross-Strait communication are not mutually exclusive. Enhanced defense capabilities and social resilience reduce security risks, while ongoing communication lowers the likelihood of miscalculation and escalation of unexpected incidents. Although Taiwan cannot determine the trajectory of U.S.-China competition, it can mitigate the economic impact of external disruptions through comprehensive preparation and effective risk management.
Liu argued that the impact of the U.S. midterm elections on Taiwan should not be evaluated solely based on party outcomes. Instead, attention should be given to post-election policy direction, U.S. economic and trade demands, and the implementation of commitments. Taiwan should deepen bipartisan engagement, strengthen self-defense capabilities, pursue reciprocal economic and trade terms, and diversify market risks. These measures will ensure sufficient policy options and flexibility to respond to changes in the U.S. political landscape, enabling Taiwan to consistently safeguard its economic, trade, and security interests.
Author: CIER Editorial Team
Date: October 14, 2026