U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping concluded their second summit on the 26th Taiwan time, with neither side’s post-meeting statements directly addressing the Taiwan issue. Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research President Lien Hsien-ming analyzed that Taiwan’s chip manufacturing capability has a decisive impact on the U.S.-China artificial intelligence (AI) race, and the United States would face enormous difficulty winning without Taiwanese manufacturing support.
Lien wrote on social media that the summit, as expected, was “much ado about nothing.” He noted that both sides hoped to achieve their respective goals through the meeting, but with divergences too wide and mutual trust insufficient, the only confirmed consensus was to “talk again next time.”
Summit Agenda Review and Taiwan’s Role
Lien summarized six major issues covered at the summit: bilateral trade and tariff truce, U.S. procurement and investment, artificial intelligence, critical mineral controls, the Iran war, and the Taiwan question. He analyzed that Trump invested considerable effort in rolling out the red carpet and personally greeting Xi at the airport, with the core calculation being to secure Xi’s help in resolving the Iran issue to salvage his party’s prospects in the upcoming midterm elections. However, “Xi is an old fox too — the Iran war conveniently pins U.S. forces down in the Middle East, so why would he possibly lend a hand?”
On the Taiwan issue, Lien believes Xi views Taiwan as a top priority, but precisely because Beijing attaches such importance to it, Washington’s strategy is to “carefully assess and then do nothing,” preserving leverage for future negotiations. He emphasized that Taiwan’s chip manufacturing is critical to the U.S.-China AI race: “Without Taiwan, it would be very difficult for the United States to win.”
Pessimistic Outlook on AI Cooperation; Semiconductor Controls Unchanged
Regarding the possibility of U.S.-China cooperation in AI, Lien bluntly called it “unfathomable.” He pointed out that Trump has repeatedly stated the United States must stay ahead of China in the AI race and still refuses to sell the highest-performance AI chips to China. Meanwhile, China neither agrees to purchase lower-tier chips nor adopts U.S.-developed large language models, choosing instead to develop its own technology path. With competition so intense on both sides, he asked rhetorically: “Which country would agree to slow down and regulate AI development?”
South Korean media reports corroborated the assessment that semiconductor controls remain unchanged. According to the Maeil Business Newspaper, the two countries agreed at the summit to establish a bilateral channel for discussing AI risks and benefits, but export controls on advanced semiconductors and equipment were not on the agenda, with both sides maintaining their existing positions. Industry insiders interpret this as meaning that core technologies in the AI hegemony competition remain positioned as strategic competition domains.
Notably, at the White House state dinner during the summit, Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang and AMD CEO Lisa Su were both seated at the head table, but according to reports, no direct conversation about semiconductor export controls took place. Xi merely expressed during the talks that “China and the United States should each leverage their strengths rather than guard against each other,” which was interpreted as dissatisfaction with U.S. export restrictions.
South Korean Memory Industry’s Dilemma
For South Korea’s memory chip industry, the summit outcome brings a complex mix of “relief and persistent tension.” The worst-case scenario of a sharp escalation in U.S.-China conflict has been temporarily ruled out in the short term, but South Korea’s Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix production bases in China remain subject to the U.S. annual equipment licensing regime, and operational uncertainty has not been eliminated.
What worries the South Korean industry even more is that U.S. export controls are paradoxically accelerating China’s semiconductor self-sufficiency drive. ChangXin Memory Technologies, China’s largest DRAM manufacturer, announced the start of mass production of fifth-generation DRAM processes on the eve of the summit and launched two products using the new process. Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post analyzed that the absence of semiconductor issues from the summit reflects that China’s level of technological self-reliance has advanced to a stage where it “no longer urgently needs advanced equipment imports.”
Limited Outcomes: Tariff Concessions and AI Dialogue
The more concrete outcomes of the summit were concentrated in the trade sphere. A White House statement indicated that the two countries agreed to provide more favorable tariff treatment for approximately $30 billion (about NT$950 billion) worth of non-sensitive goods in each direction, covering U.S. exports of agricultural products, timber, and cosmetics, as well as imports from China including small appliances, toys, and decorative items.
On artificial intelligence, the two sides agreed to engage in dialogue on AI risks and benefits, with the next round of discussions scheduled for November, and to establish a communication channel for AI-related incidents. The White House said the two leaders agreed to use the term “super intelligence” in place of “artificial intelligence,” which the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs affirmed.
“Yuyuan Tantian,” a social media account under China’s state broadcaster CCTV, published commentary after the summit citing Xi’s remarks, emphasizing that the United States and China should work together to keep AI under human control and steer technology toward benefiting the public. The commentary also called on government departments at all levels to implement the consensus reached at the summit, including trade and investment consultation mechanisms and the $30 billion reciprocal tariff concession arrangement.
Lien remained reserved about the summit’s substantive outcomes. He believes the only areas where concrete results are realistically achievable are tariffs, trade, and rare earths, following the pattern of the previous summit: the U.S. side agrees to lower some tariffs, while China commits to increasing agricultural purchases and rare earth exports, leaving more substantive issues for the year-end summit. He revealed that friends at U.S. think tanks therefore predict Trump will not approve arms sales to Taiwan before year-end.
Taiwan Tech Industry’s Strategic Response
Taiwan Institute of Economic Research Industry Database Director Liu Pei-chen analyzed that after the Trump-Xi summit, the structural challenges facing Taiwan’s tech industry remain unchanged. The U.S. defense line on critical technology controls has not loosened due to high-level political meetings; rather, fine-tuning of control boundaries has become a bargaining chip in political negotiations. Taiwanese wafer foundry and advanced packaging companies must demonstrate greater flexibility in order structures and global capacity deployment.
Liu noted that if the U.S. and China establish some form of conflict guardrail through dialogue, it could reduce foreign investors’ concerns about risk discounts on Taiwanese tech stocks in the short term. However, if the talks remain merely symbolic without substantive reciprocal mechanisms, geopolitical uncertainty will quickly return. She believes that as Taiwan’s semiconductor and electronics manufacturing services industries continue to diversify capacity toward allied nations such as the U.S., Japan, and Europe, they must ensure that core technology and R&D foundations remain in Taiwan while continuing to widen the technology gap with pursuers.
Observing the summit results, the strategic competition between the U.S. and China in AI and semiconductors will not change in the short term. Taiwan’s geopolitical importance as a critical hub for global advanced chip manufacturing has become even more pronounced after the summit, but it also means Taiwan’s tech industry will remain at the forefront of great-power rivalry.