The Fourth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China concluded, and rows of empty tables and chairs in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People hinted at a new wave of anti-corruption efforts within the Party. How will the large number of absent officials help Xi Jinping fulfill his 15th Five-Year Plan for technological self-reliance?
The recently concluded fourth plenary session of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party had the lowest attendance rate since 1978, with only 168 of the 205 Central Committee members turning up, translating to an absence rate of 18%, while just 147 alternate members of the Central Committee attended, equating to an absence rate of 14%.
The rows of empty seats inside the Great Hall of the People in Beijing showed the effects of anti-corruption crackdowns within the CCP.
Military Hardest Hit
Even before the committee began, the CCP expelled nine of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) top generals, including Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), He Weidong (何衛東), and director of the CMC’s political work department, Miao Hua (苗華). Another ten full members and four alternate members were purged during the committee—another historic high—with most of the ousted hailing from the military. The result is that CMC membership has been reduced from seven to four, and while General Zhang Shengmin (張升民) has been promoted to Vice Chairman of the CMC, the other vacancies have not been filled.
Jérôme Doyon, Junior Professor at the Centre for International Relations (CERI) at Sciences Po Paris, comments that “This shows Xi Jinping cannot find anyone he truly trusts to put into a key position of power.” He Weidong’s spot in the Politburo has also been left vacant, revealing an indecisiveness in reforming the ranks.
Xi’s ‘Confidence Crisis’
The downfall of so many military leaders with close ties to Xi from the 73rd Group Army (formerly known as the 31st Group Army) has led to speculation of an internal power struggle.
However, Hsin-hsien Wang (王信賢), Acting Director of the Institute of International Relations at Chengchi University, has a different take. He sees this as Xi’s habitual sense of unease toward factions within the CCP and his defensive countermeasures put into action. “The new blood aren’t his old staff and don’t have his trust. If Xi senses they’re forming their own clique, he will immediately drop the hammer.”
Wang’s opinion is that Xi is striving for balance between the party and the military, as he cannot allow any one side to become a dominant force.
The crackdown on corruption reflects his attempt to reorganize the power structure and weed out potential threats to his rule.
A Change in Military Strategy
He Weidong was the mastermind behind the “gray zone tactics” used against Taiwan after U.S. politician Nancy Pelosi’s visit in 2022. His banishment resulted in a decrease in the number of Chinese military planes crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait but an increase in incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone in the southwest and southeast. Cheng-kun Ma (馬振坤), Professor at National Defense University, says this proves the PLA has shifted gears from harassing Taiwan to conducting “anti-access/area denial” (A2/AD) operations against U.S. armed forces.
Tech Self-reliance Prioritized in 15th Five-Year Plan
Although political upheaval obscured the focus of the committee, the fourth plenum was meant to review China’s 15th Five-Year Plan. Sources say that the main thread is still “tech self-reliance” and “new quality productive forces”, in line with the broader strategic goals of “Made in China 2025” and “Dual Circulation”.
Doyon opines that this is an unwavering continuity of the 15th Five-Year Plan, except now there’s a greater emphasis on national security.
Chia-Hsuan Wu (吳佳勳), Deputy Director at the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, says that “Beijing has recognized that economic stability is a matter of national security.” She observes that, although weakening buying power is the main cause of deflation, the CCP’s focus on improving livelihoods and stimulating consumption is still second to tech self-reliance, reflecting an obstinate single-mindedness in the ruling party’s priorities.
National Security Over Prosperity
Wu says, “The China-U.S. rivalry has shown that being limited by another country’s technology is a more serious issue than waning consumption.”
During the next five years, Beijing will continue to pour its resources into advanced manufacturing and tech self-reliance, while domestic demand and market reform will be put on the back burner.
Roiled by lackluster attendance and the purging of military representatives, the fourth plenary session revealed the deepening of Xi’s national security and political power concerns, despite its ostensible focus on economic planning.
For the ruler of China, tech self-reliance has become the only answer to how he will maintain political stability while taking care of China’s future.