U.S. Hawkish Stance on China Intensifies as Tech Rivalry Expands to AI Compute

U.S.-China technology competition continues to intensify, now encompassing not only advanced chips and semiconductor equipment but also AI infrastructure and computing resources. Scholars at the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research (CIER) suggest that the recent controversy involving NVIDIA founder and CEO Jensen Huang may reflect internal divisions regarding U.S. technology policy toward China and the increasing influence of hawkish perspectives in Washington. As the U.S. expands restrictions on advanced chips and overseas AI compute, global technology supply chains and AI development strategies are poised for a new phase of realignment.

On November 19, 2026, the CIER held the “2027 International Economic and Trade Outlook Forum.” Ming-Min Yang, Assistant Executive Director of CIER’s Center for International Trade Policy, noted that the United States is advancing the Pax Silica initiative while China has established the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization. These actions show that both countries are actively constructing distinct technology cooperation systems and encouraging other nations to participate. Although Taiwan has not formally signed the relevant agreements, it is effectively integrated into the U.S.-led cooperation framework.

Jensen Huang Controversy Highlights U.S. Divisions Over China Technology Policy

Yang noted that China possesses advantages in AI model development costs and energy resources, while the United States maintains control over critical technologies such as advanced chips. The two countries are now pursuing distinct approaches to AI development. Although U.S.-China competition does not equate to a technology Cold War, the divergence between their technology systems has become increasingly apparent.

Regarding the controversy involving Jensen Huang, Yang observed that the timing of the issue, which attracted attention around the U.S. midterm elections, is noteworthy and may reflect differing perspectives within the United States on technology policy toward China. One side, represented by Huang, advocates an industry-oriented approach that supports maintaining some chip exports to China. The other side, represented by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, adopts a more hawkish stance toward China, indicating that hard-line policy positions may be gaining influence in Washington.

U.S. Expands Chip and Overseas Computing Power Restrictions as AI Infrastructure Emerges as a New Competitive Arena

In terms of technology controls, the United States has used the Entity List to restrict Chinese companies, including Huawei and SMIC, from obtaining certain technologies and products. It has also imposed restrictions on exports of advanced chips and encouraged allies such as the Netherlands and Japan to tighten controls on semiconductor equipment exports. Additionally, the United States applies the Foreign Direct Product Rules (FDPR) to foreign-produced items made using U.S. technology or software, thereby extending the reach of its controls.

Yang added that the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) within the U.S. Department of Commerce recently issued new export controls on AI chips. The rules prevent overseas data centers from remotely providing advanced computing capacity to Chinese companies. They also require prior licenses for chip exports to Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Brazil to prevent China from obtaining controlled computing resources through third countries.

Overall, U.S. technology controls targeting China have expanded beyond chip exports and semiconductor manufacturing equipment to encompass overseas data centers and access to AI computing capacity. This development signals a shift from hardware supply chains to AI infrastructure. As U.S. and Chinese technology systems continue to diverge, Taiwan must preserve its critical role in semiconductor supply chains and closely monitor changes in U.S. policy and international cooperation frameworks. It should respond prudently to the spillover effects of these expanding controls.

Author: CIER Editorial Team
Date: November 20, 2026