In August the White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy released a report titled The Great Transshipment Scam whose cover page featured a giant Trojan Horse. The report flagged more than 40 countries as risks for origin laundering of Chinese goods, claiming such origin-shifting trade costs the United States more than US$100 billion per year.
Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea were named among the report’s Tier 1 countries of concern. Three weeks after the report was issued, the Investigation Bureau under Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice announced it had cracked 60 origin-laundering cases in Taiwan.
The Investigation Bureau is already the third government agency getting involved in the crack-down on illegal transshipments. In April last year, when the Trump administration launched its reciprocal tariff war, Taiwan’s Ministry of Finance was ordered to step up enforcement, and the Customs Administration carried out nearly 50,000 inspections over the following year. “Our bureau never used to handle origin-laundering cases. This is the first time,” notes Section Chief Chen Chi-min (陳啟民).
The era of major restrictions has arrived.
CommonWealth Magazine research has found that over the past six months U.S. restrictions have expanded from semiconductors, wafers, and servers to advanced packaging equipment, semiconductor materials, communications, IC substrates, and heavy electrical equipment.
In early September, the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) invited Unimicron Technology Corp., Kinsus Interconnect Technology Corp., and other IC substrate manufacturers to a meeting, expressing hopes that they set up factories in the United States. This would allow the United States to build a complete local supply chain from wafer production, advanced packaging and testing to IC substrates. A chairman of a supplier in TSMC’s CoWoS supply chain predicts, “Going forward, it will be hard for Taiwan’s supply chain to avoid getting swept up.”
Chris Miller, a historian at Tufts University and author of Chip War, points out that the key for winning the race for higher computing power is the optimization of 3D chip stacking, interconnect technologies, and entire AI systems.
Optical communication has become a new focus.
In August, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) announced a draft rule that would restrict the import of certain models of China-made optical transceivers. TrendForce estimates that Chinese manufacturers of optical transceivers, such as Zhongji Innolight (Innolight) and Eoptolink, account for 56 percent of the global market.
The decoupling has already begun. The chairman of a Taiwanese optical transceiver manufacturer confirms that customers demand that “starting with the new models, production must not take place in China anymore.”
In June, the U.S. Department of War added Innolight, which holds a 25 percent market share, to its list of “Chinese Military Companies Operating in the United States,” and its share price was cut in half. While Innolight also has a production base in Taiwan, it remains to be seen whether Washington allows its Taiwan-made products into the country. If the United States demands complete decoupling, then Taiwanese suppliers such as LandMark Optoelectronics, Elite Advanced Laser, and FOCI Fiber Optic Communications will emerge as winners. Gemtek Technology has already announced that it will produce in the United States.
But Taiwanese manufacturers also face new risks.
Liu Da-nien (劉大年) of the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research warns that the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) signed between the United States and Taiwan this February allows the United States to exercise long-arm jurisdiction over whom Taiwanese companies export to. Companies do not only need to know where their raw materials come from but also to whom they sell their products.
Taiwan’s export controls are far less comprehensive than those of the United States. Lawyer Chen Yen-po (陳言博) points out that Taiwan often prosecutes illicit transshipment as document forgery, which is a crime with “very light penalties.” Two efforts to amend the law to tighten controls failed because the scope was hard to define and lawmakers feared hurting Taiwanese businesses that rely on a cross-Strait division of labor.
A national security source notes that a more feasible approach would be to build on the existing controls on 12 categories of semiconductor equipment and study expanding export controls on high-end chips and other goods to China.
The specter of tighter controls looms over the computing supply chain. The government’s wisdom and Taiwanese manufacturers’ resilience are being put to the test as decoupling presents challenge and opportunity.
By Kaiyuan Teng